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Two Logics of Climate Change Games:
Environmental Governance and Know-How Competition
Hongyuan Yu1
Abstract
Global warming and the resulting climate change present the world with major and
potentially devastating challenges. They lead to environmental degradation/scarcity and a
radical reform of the energy mix among industrial countries, in addition to other nontraditional security concerns.2 From the 1992 Rio Summit through the Kyoto Conference and
the Bali Roadmap, a generation has passed since the world's governments began to seriously
consider the problems of global warming and the resulting climate change. It is now patently
clear that the world should get together to combat the climate disaster. However, we are
always confused with two questions: why has global climate governance been so difficult,
and what factors hamper the effectiveness of international cooperation. This article will give
an explanation to two logics of climate change games by linking environmental governance
and know-how competition.
For those concerned about climate change, collective actions and regimes designed to
limit carbon emissions are at the core of global warming concerns. However, preventing
catastrophic climate change is actually an energy challenge that leads to dramatic know-how
competition in both new and alternative energy. In the international collective action against
global warming, on the one hand, the pursuit of rational common goods leads to cooperation;
on the other hand, the pursuit of rational self-interest or preference (in carbon emissions and
energy know-how) among different states often frustrates international cooperation. Thus
there are two logics of the climate change games: the logic of collective action in
international environmental cooperation; and the logic of power competition in energy
innovation, which is the foundation of power transition in this century. The energy revolution
induced by global warming includes the discovery and exclusive possession of new energy
sources, along with revolutionary progress in the promotion and application of new energy
technology, improved social and economic efficiency, and government control over energy
use. Not surprisingly, the transition of power and hegemony in the future will most likely be
connected to energy.
In the fight against global warming, Western countries not only need to deal with the
failure of collective action among Annex I countries (developed countries),3 but also resolve
interest conflicts between themselves. They also have to encourage developing countries to
share concrete responsibilities in global governance on global climate change. Particularly,
the rich countries—the European Union, Japan and the United States—have and will
continue to achieve domination in the process of climate change politics, and they will
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compete for leadership in new and alternative energy, which is at the core of a low-carbon
economy.
China, which is the world's largest economic powerhouse and polluter, is central to
both regional and global efforts against global warming, particularly in the post-Kyoto
climate negotiations. The two-layer games in global climate change politics will pose double
challenges on the country’s domestic political economy and diplomacy. China’s current
development route is still a growth-oriented, unsustainable and resource-constrained
economic model, and the country faces the crucial need to promote development while
joining the global struggle against global warming and contributing to global economic
growth. The government in Beijing seeks to act as a “responsible stakeholder in the
international system,” while pursuing a “scientific outlook on development” in its national
economic development. On the one hand, given the growing absolute carbon emissions,
China has turned into an “environmental superpower;”4on the other hand, its energy-intensive
economy is not only pushing up growth rates in the United States, Japan, the EU and other
economies, but also strengthening the capacity building for low-carbon and new energy. With
these considerations in mind, in this paper, I look at some of the consequences and
characteristics of the two-layer games in global climate change politics. Then I describe
international and domestic implications for China.
1. Two Logics of Climate Change Games
In this analysis of the two logics of the international struggle against climate change, the first
focus is on how to limit carbon emissions in different countries on the basis of the global
collective action theory.5 The other focus is on the competitive advantage of nations resulting
from energy know-how.6
1.1. The Logic of Collective Action in International Environmental Cooperation
The future of the international struggle against global warming depends on collective action
and shared responsibilities.7 The international regime for averting climate change has sought
to overcome this problem since the early 1990s. But the international effort against global
warming has produced mixed results. The explanations of both liberals and constructivists
look powerful in articulating an ideal condition or performance for collective action, but
somewhat thin in explaining the effectiveness of the collective action which has been
undertaken. The effectiveness of collective action involves two overlapping ideas: first,
which members of the regime abide by its norms and rules, and second whether the regime
achieves its objectives or fulfills certain purposes. 8 Apparently, the effectiveness of the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol is very low. These divergences affect the effectiveness of
the UNFCCC so much that a new theoretical analysis beyond constructivism or neoliberalism
should be built.
Under Mancur Olson’s collective action theory, three variables—selective
inducement, optimal group structure or institution building, and major power—will determine
the effectiveness of collective action. Major power interaction determines the rules and
legitimacy of collective action. Selective inducements shape the pay-off structure of
4
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collective action. Institution building will help maintain structure stability in collective
action. Among these three variables, major power plays a significant role. First, selective
inducements depend on the preference structure and group scale. Second, the flexibility and
payoff structure of the Kyoto Protocol affect the effectiveness of collective action against
climate change. Third, when an established power abandons global collective action in some
areas, some emerging powers will replace its role and push the collective action agenda
forward.
A reduction of carbon emissions is at the core of collective action against climate
change, and it has an impact on the material and physical foundations needed for the survival
of a state. Since no country, by itself, would be able to substantially influence the climate
system, according to the principle of summation,9 all states in the world should make efforts
to limit carbon emissions. The key concern is the payoff structure for carbon emission
reductions among different signatory countries. Currently, most scholars have introduced
market mechanisms to resolve the collective action problems. These models are designed and
forwarded to the carbon credit market. Examples include CDM, IET and JI.
Homer-Dixon argued that climate change problems may soon increase the level of
conflict between poor and rich countries. 10 Some Western scholars termed developing
countries’ climate policy the “maxi-mini principle”—one based on the maximization of rights
and minimization of responsibilities. Under this view, some developing states are only
interested in “free rides” and in gaining access to technical expertise, foreign aid, and
information in order to further their goal of economic development.11 Christopher D. Stone
used the “free-rider” behaviors among poor countries in climate change as strong evidence to
support carbon emission limitations in poor countries.12
1.2. International Competition for New Energy
Energy is fundamental to the prosperity and security of nations. The next-generation energy
will determine not only the future of the international economic system but also the transition
of power. Competition in the energy chain will determine the result of the power struggle
based on innovation and influence power transition in the international system. The new
energy is not only an important constituent of the next-generation energy system, but also
will change the scenario of the future international power configuration. As Daniel Yergin13
of the “American oil hegemony” and Paul Kennedy 14 of the “British coal hegemony”
indicate, the prerequisite condition of significant structural changes in the international
system is an energy power revolution based on the emergence of next-generation energy-led
countries. Technological innovation is of key importance in the energy power structure.
Modelski's long-cycle theory,15 Kondratev’s long-wave theory, and Schumpeter’s economiccycle theory16 have all confirmed the historical contribution of the technological revolution
and institutional innovation to the rise and fall of great powers. They all emphasized the
effect of a “great technological breakthrough” on the world economic cycle, indicating that
9
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the cycle should owe its rise to the technological breakthrough, which mainly happened in
energy areas such as the electricity steam engine and the internal-combustion engine. Michael
E. Porter, in his book The Competitive Advantage of Nations explained why nations should
make an innovation-based model of comparative advantages a priority in developing their
competitive advantage.17
With the heated debate on collective action against climate change, Western countries
have monopolized the future energy system based on new and alternative energy. Peter Evens
once pointed out that every major power that dominated the international system had some
know-how advantages.18 For now, it seems that a low-carbon economy and clean energy will
ultimately determine the future of energy power transition. Jonathan and other scholars
recognized that the EU’s environmental policy geared toward boosting the bloc’s
competitiveness and promoting climate negotiations could also boost its creativity and
competitive advantage. 19 In 2007, the Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate
Change20 and the Low Carbon Economy Report by the Royal Institute of International Affairs
both confirmed that the EU promoted climate negotiations not just because it was a
forerunner in a low-carbon economy, but also wanted to achieve dominance in global
governance and lay foundations for the future economy. U.S. senior officers Paula
Dobriansky, Richard Lee Armitage and Joseph Nye once proposed that U.S. involvement in
climate negotiations could enhance the nation’s “smart power” and the competitiveness of its
industry.21
Western countries always use the fast growing carbon emissions in new emerging
economies as a strong explanation for global warming. National competitive advantages are
associated with carbon emission reductions. For those who advocate climate diplomacy,
environmental capacity is one important part of a state's comprehensive national power.
Thomas Homer-Dixon supports limitations in developing countries’ environmental capacity
and economic growth. 22 James N. Rosenau uses the concept of a “balance of payments”
instead of a “balance of power” in global environmental governance, and argues that
developing countries should share the costs and responsibilities for global environmental
protection.23
2. The Logic of Collective Action in Climate Change
2.1. The Different Responses of the EU and the U.S.
The EU’s climate diplomacy aims to serve the bloc’s leadership in global governance. The
EU has been closely involved in the international debate on global warming and climate
change. EU countries have always been “at the forefront of efforts to strengthen the
international commitments on climate change.” 24 The bloc plays the role of a leader and
17
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advocate of international action against global warming and climate change. The EU has used
its dual status as the biggest economic bloc and its growing role as a major advocate of
international commitments on climate change. The EU is one of the largest donors of
environmental aid and the strongest supporters of the Kyoto Protocol during COP
conferences. The EU’s leadership on climate change has international legitimacy.25
The EU spends “more resources on initiating more awareness of climate impacts in
developing countries.” 26 Moreover, European countries try their best to persuade other
countries to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. At the EU Council Meeting on May 31, 2001, the EU
decided to strengthen the capacity building of developing countries against global warming.
The EU supported Kyoto mechanisms such as joint implementation among Annex I
countries, but was concerned that the U.S. would avoid a reduction in domestic carbon
emissions by trading environmental emissions with developing countries. A carbon tax is also
a good experience for EU climate change policy implementation. 27 The policy has been
introduced by many signatories to the UNFCCC. In 2004, the EU’s willingness to trade
support for Russia’s accession to the WTO for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol gave an
unprecedented impetus to the international struggle against climate change. In 2007, the EU’s
endeavors saved the Bali Roadmap, preventing sharp conflicts between rich and poor
countries.
The United States, which is the largest emitter, is central to the global collective
action. Since 1997, the U.S. State Department has published its annual Environmental
Diplomacy Report,28 which evaluates global climate change diplomacy. “The United States
was a global leader in the early development of policies and regulatory programs to protect
environmental quality.”29 Under the Clinton administration, the U.S. announced a $1 billion
five-year effort to help developing countries cut emissions and meet the goals of the climate
change treaty. However, after 2001, the Bush administration put climate change on the back
burner. The U.S. government argued that the Kyoto Protocol was unfair to the United States,
and the Bush administration withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. Under the Bush
administration, the U.S. has shifted more responsibility to private industry to guide pollutioncutting efforts in the Third World.30 In 2001, the Bush administration declared that it would
reduce the amount of money set aside in the U.S. budget for programs intended to help
countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Mexico, Poland, and Russia, in
order to increase their industrial development with only minimal contributions to global
warming. 31 In 2005, Hurricane Katrina battered the U.S. Gulf Coast and caused great
economic costs. Hurricane Katrina forced the Bush administration to place an emphasis on
global environmental protection. The United States is working with other countries through a
aussenpolitik.deSprinz.Climate_Change_After_Marrakech.GFPD.vol2(6)2001>, German Policy in Dialogue,
vol. 2, No. 6, 4th Quarter 2001, Trier, Germany.
25
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series of bilateral or multilateral forums launched by top government leaders on global
warming. These include Major Economies Meetings, G8, and AP6.
Common goods mean joint supply and the impossibility of excluding others from
consumption once these goods are supplied to some members of the community. 32 This
means that any country, including India, China, Japan and the U.S., should contribute to
mitigating global warming, and that they cannot seek to withhold goods from other
countries.33 Thus, Western countries are working hard to avoid “free-rider” behaviors and are
trying to persuade China to join the campaign. The U.S., EU and other developed countries
are urging China, India and other developing countries to assume responsibility for reducing
carbon emissions as soon as possible. Otherwise a rapid increase of carbon emissions in the
developing world may counterbalance the endeavors of the rich countries. The Bush
administration argues that the Kyoto Protocol is unfair to the United States and other
industrialized nations because it exempts 80 percent of the world, particularly China, from
compliance.34
Figure 1: The Common Goods

Exclusiveness
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Private Goods
Common Pool Resource

Collective Goods
Public Goods

Interestingly, in some carefully selected areas, developing countries have discretely
cooperated with the U.S. in UNFCCC negotiations. For instance, China agreed with the U.S.
that employing adaptation measures—such as transferring funds and technologies from
developed to developing countries to help the latter minimize the impact of climate change—
was the preferable way of addressing the problem. Among developed countries, the EU
places more emphasis on mitigation than on adaptation in climate change negotiations. But
the United States, China, India and members of the OPEC believe that adaptation should be a
priority. By shifting the focus of climate talks to adaptation, both the U.S. and China could
actually avoid hurting their economies and refused immediate commitment to fixed emission
cuts. Moreover, both the U.S. and China are skeptical about a global carbon tax supported by
the EU as a mitigation measure from which revenue could be spent to finance technological
transfers. They believe that both producers in China and consumers in America would be
overburdened.
2.2. Developed against Developing: Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and
Equity in Collective Action against Global Warming
While the U.S. and other developed countries enjoy a relatively plentiful, wasteful and
competitive use of energy, most developing countries struggle for the very basic needs of
industrialization, urbanization and life’s physical necessities. The developing world considers
it an inalienable right to advance its economy and enjoy the same standard of living as people
in developed countries. It’s an inalienable right of the developing world to further develop its
economy, improve living standards, and enjoy the same living standards as people in the
developed countries. Of the world's six billion people, one-third enjoys electricity. And one
third—two billion people—simply lack access to modern energy services and live on less
32
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than $2 per day. For the poor countries, ensuring economic growth and lifting people out of
poverty are necessarily important priorities. Greater energy use by these countries and greater
emissions from them are therefore inevitable.35 For China, the largest developing country,
global warming issues have been intimately linked with efforts to modernize the economy
and the energy strategy employed to fuel that modernization. If China decreases its emissions
of greenhouse gas (GHG) by 10-20%, its GDP will decrease by 2%. When per capita income
grows by 5.1%, GHG emissions increase by 1.29%. 36 Mukund Govind Rajan argues that
“India’s sustained increase in energy production and use was to play a central role in fueling
economic development. There is a very low per capita consumption of greenhouse gases as
compared to the world average.”37 According to Mukund Govind Rajan, “It is the developed
countries which have created and continue to add to the threats of climate change, and it is
primarily their responsibility to reverse the situation by setting limits on their emissions of
greenhouse gases. Developing countries contribute little to the problem, though their share is
increasing. Their resources are scarce and they do not have ready access to the required
technologies. They need technical and financial assistance to adopt environmentally benign
technologies. Even given adequate resources their socioeconomic backwardness may prevent
them from fully attaining the desired results.”38
Figure 2: The Payoff Structure in Climate Change
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The figure below shows that different states can have different payoffs and utility in
the international campaign against global warming. Some states’ payoff is very high, while
for others it is very low. Some states have no payoff at all, but they can also enjoy the utility
from the cooperation. Even those who do nothing to limit their carbon emissions can share
35
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the benefits of reduced carbon emissions, in disregard of the moral hazard, ill reputation or
punishment involved. 39 Such “free-riding” behaviors frustrate the endeavors of other
countries. Any country, including China, can try to enjoy the technology transfer,
environmental loans and other utilities without trying to reduce carbon emissions. On the
other hand, different countries will have different utilities from international cooperation
against global warming. Poor countries pay more attention to technology improvement and
economic development than environmental gains. On the contrary, most developed countries
prefer a better natural environment and put more emphasis on environmental security. From
this point of view, developing countries should contribute more to reducing carbon emissions.
The game theory is the study of people’s behavior in strategic situations, so it can be
used to analyze the two logics of the climate change games when people make different
choices on cooperation in climate change. Developing countries have two choices: A) refrain
from reducing greenhouse gas emissions unless developed countries provide the technology
and funds; B) reduce carbon emissions unconditionally. If developing countries choose
strategy B, as they have promised to share global responsibility for global warming,
developed countries will be confronted with two choices: C) decide against providing
technology and funds to developing countries; D) decide to provide technology and funds to
developing countries. If developed countries choose C, developing countries may consider
slowing down the increase in their carbon emissions because they lack advanced technology
and funds. So the gains will be –1 and –3. If developed countries choose D, developing
countries will be able to afford to reduce carbon emissions by building a low-carbon society.
So they both gain +5.
Figure 3: The game between developing and developed countries
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Developed countries are the principal emitters of pollutants and should therefore bear
the primary responsibilities in addressing the climate change problem. The principle of
“common but differentiated responsibilities” is a global consensus in the UNFCCC and other
international environmental laws. This principle means that the industrialized, wealthy
countries of the world bear responsibility for global warming because of their historic
emissions of greenhouse gases for more than 300 years. Furthermore, developed countries’
per capita emissions remain far above those of developing countries, meaning that their
responsibility continues. According to the UNFCCC, “The largest share of the historical and
current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, [while]
per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and the share of global
emissions originating in developing countries is growing to meet their social and
development needs.”40 However, developing countries are deeply dissatisfied with developed
countries in this respect because the latter refuse to pay sufficient attention to the
technological backwardness of developing countries as far as energy is concerned. Developed
countries tend to play down the role of technology transfer while maintaining high prices for
intellectual property rights linked with these technologies.
Since its inception, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) has promoted technology
transfer, grants and loans from the developed world for reducing carbon emissions through a
39
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series of projects in developing countries. However, since its launch in 1991, the GEF has
only allocated about $4 billion in grants.41 Through CDM, industrialized countries could also
meet part of their obligations for reducing their emissions under the Kyoto Protocol by
receiving credits for investing in projects that reduce carbon emissions in developing
countries.
2.3. International Norms and Climate Change Cooperation in Poor Countries
The UNFCCC reads, “Acknowledging that change in the Earth's climate and its adverse
effects are a common concern of humankind; acknowledging that the global nature of climate
change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an
effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic
conditions; determined to protect the climate system for present and future generations...”
Katzenstein argues that the concepts of international norms refer to collective expectations
for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. Norms thus either define (or
constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behaviors, or they do both.42 This means that
international norms in collective action influence the behavior of individual states.
Considering the question of what is the most important international factor motivating China
to improve its climate change coordination work, it is necessary to analyze the influence of
various interest-based factors on the global climate change action from 2003 to 2007.43

Figure 4: What is the most important international factor affecting coordination work in China? 2003
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Figure 5: What is the most important international factor affecting coordination work in China? 2007
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3. The Logic of International Competition for New Energy
Generally speaking, climate change is a major issue that has brought a lot of pressure to
global energy and environmental conservation efforts. Although most countries have
recognized the seriousness of the crisis and the need for emission reductions, the United
States and the EU are still thinking of ways to curb carbon emissions and reduce demand for
energy in developing countries. The conclusion is clear: on the surface, climate change is just
a problem of collective action on how to handle the crisis and stabilize carbon emissions, but
on the deep level it is a problem of energy sources and development potential that could
affect the transition of power in the international system in the long term.
3.1. Transition in the Traditional Energy System
The contemporary world is based on oil, and global energy security is crucial to economic
growth and people's livelihood in all countries. Energy is also fundamental to the prosperity
and security of nations. The advent of globalization, the growing gap between the rich and
poor, and the need to fight global warming are all intertwined with energy concerns. There is
a pressing need for strategic thinking about the international energy system. Supply and
demand on the international energy market are imbalanced. Areas rich in oil resources are
still at the center of geopolitical, political and military conflicts. Energy exporting nations use
energy weapons to implement their political and economic goals. Major energy suppliers—
from Russia to Iran to Venezuela—have been increasingly able and willing to use their
energy resources to pursue their strategic and political objectives.44 It is also important to take
a long-term perspective, deepen energy cooperation, increase energy efficiency, and facilitate
the development and use of new energy resources.
Climate change will bring dramatic changes in the international economic system, and
national competition advantages will be built on the basis of clean and alternative energy.
The advent of global warming and energy security pose a great challenge to humankind.
Competition in the energy chain will determine power struggles based on innovation and
influence power transition in the international system. New energy is not only an important
constituent of the next-generation energy system, but will also change the scenario of the
future international power arrangement. Preventing an environmental disaster like climate
change is, at its core, an energy challenge. Different economies struggle and compete for this
historical opportunity to increase energy efficiency, and facilitate the development and use of
new energy resources.
3.2. Power Transition and the New Energy Chain
There is a correlation between energy competition driven by climate change and the
international political economic environment, know-how, ability and possession of resources.
The interaction of these factors constitutes a complete energy chain. The energy chain
comprises the institutions and activities related to the search for, development, and utilization
of energy resources. The discovery of new energy sources, revolutionary changes in the
energy chain, and the corresponding changes in the political economy and the innovation
system, have combined to lay the groundwork for a more effective use of energy, which is
fundamental to the rise of big powers. Historically, the emergence of great powers has been
accompanied by a rise of a new generation of energy. Since the establishment of the modern
international system, the energy chain has undergone two major changes. The first change
was the first industrial revolution of the 1860s ushered in by the United Kingdom and marked
by a transition from “the fuel-wood or bio-fuel times” to the “coal era.” The second change
44
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was the second industrial revolution of the 1920s started by the United States and marked by
a transition from the “coal era” to the “oil age.” Today a third revolution is taking place based
on clean and low-carbon energy. Under the long-cycle theory, possession and use of new
energy is closely related with national technological and institutional advances. Countries
with a dominant position in new energy must have an institutional and technical advantage
stemming from their possession and use of new energy. They have to break through
constraints imposed by previous economic, political structures and ideology, which leads to
major changes in the global industrial chain, allocation of resources and national
competitiveness. Therefore we have every reason to believe that those new energy
powerhouses will ultimately change the global arrangement of power through international
competition in the future. As history shows, every significant structural change in the
international system has been due to the revolution in the energy chain. The country or nonstate entity that seized a new energy chain or a part of it attempted to challenge the
international status quo.
3.3. The Domination of Rich Countries in New Energy Competition
As the scarcity of traditional energy and climate change emerged as serious problems,
economic growth patterns in various countries gradually evolved in a direction that suited
new energy. The EU and the United States as global superpowers aspire to corner future
energy markets through negotiations on reducing carbon emissions coupled with a desire to
dominate the drive toward clean energy and energy efficiency and innovation throughout
building a climate change regime. In December 2007, the United States passed a new energy
bill that aims to boost the development of clean and alternative energy. President Bush said,
“Energy dependence harms the U.S. economically through high and volatile prices at the gas
pump, creates pollution and contributes to greenhouse gas emissions. It threatens our national
security by making us vulnerable to hostile regimes in unstable regions of the world.”45Under
the new energy bill, production of renewable fuels is expected to exceed 136 billion liters
annually by 2022. More than half of all ethanol must come from sources other than corn, such
as wood chips or switchgrass. The law also sets tougher efficiency standards for the
construction of new commercial properties and improvements in federal buildings.
The EU has taken many measures to reduce carbon emissions among member states
in line with the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. There are four major objectives of the
EU’s climate policy: “1) a regulatory approach, 2) fiscal measures, 3) burden sharing among
member states, and 4) the scope for complementary action at the national level.”46Since the
sixth Environmental Action Program, the climate change issue has caused great concerns.47
According to the EU National Communications to the UNFCCC, “The European
Commission has proposed in particular: (1) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions beyond the
Kyoto commitments, by 1% of their 1990 levels every year until 2020; (2) To set more
ambitious environmental targets for energy taxation, such as automatically indexing taxes at
least to the level of inflation; to phase out all subsidies for fossil fuel production and
consumption by 2010, undertaking steps to develop alternative sources of employment for the
sectors concerned. The European Union also needs to think about the specific situation of
coal in some candidate countries, within the framework of the accession negotiations; (4) that
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by 2010, alternative fuels, including biofuels, should account for at least 7% of the fuel
consumed by cars and trucks.”48
The EU is struggling to agree on the details of its plan to reduce the 27-nation bloc's
greenhouse-gas pollution by 20 percent by 2020 compared with the benchmark year 1990.
They promised to deepen this to 30 percent if another industrialized power followed suit.
They also pledged to boost the share of renewables in the EU energy mix to 20 percent,
including a 10-percent share for bio-fuels.49
Most developing countries follow a growth-oriented, unsustainable and resourceconstrained economic model. These countries face the crucial need to promote development
while joining the global struggle against global warming and contributing to global economic
growth. As countries undergo industrial development, they move through a period of
intensive, and often inefficient, use of fossil fuel. Efficiencies improve along this
development trajectory, but eventually tend to level off. Industrialized countries such as EU
member states, Japan and the United States are at a knowledge-intensity and energy levelingoff stage, while developing countries such as China are at the energy-intensive development
stage. Both factors are decreasing the global efficiency of fossil fuel use and increasing
energy consumption. But a high growth of energy consumption is required for the capitalintensive industrialization period in today’s China and other developing economies, and will
be reduced at post-industrialization stages sooner or later. However, developed countries
have not displayed enough enthusiasm transferring advanced clean energy technologies to the
developing world.
In facing the continuing economic rise of the emerging countries, the United States, or
even the European countries and Japan, would not give these countries the core
technologies.50 They would, on the one hand, prevent the other countries from acquiring the
core technology, thus to weaken their competitiveness; on the other hand, they are worried
that the emerging countries would not protect the intellectual property rights of the advanced
technologies. Moreover, the United States is unwilling to see China and other emerging
countries improve their structure of energy production and use. From the viewpoint of the
United States, if China successfully transformed itself to the way of sustainable development,
the Chinese model of development would threaten the soft power of the U.S.
On December 2007, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) said in one of
its reports that in addressing climate change issues developed countries “did not take the
responsibility to help developing countries.” In 2007, at the United Nations Climate Change
Conference in Bali, Oxfam Hong Kong, an independent development and relief agency based
in Hong Kong, said that the international community needs some $1-2 billion to make the
least developed countries adapt to the most urgent requirements of climate change; however,
developed countries have donated no more than $67 million for this purpose.51 In December
2007, the Bali Roadmap was adopted whereby developed countries undertook to assist
developing countries in clean energy development; however, no clear commitments have
been made in this process so far.52
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4. The Implications of the Two Logics of Climate Change Games for China
4.1. The Influence of the Two Logics of Climate Change Games
The two logics of the climate change games influence China on three counts. First, developed
countries continue to dominate international climate change negotiations. The fight against
global warming can be described in terms of common goods. Even though there are many
internal contradictions among rich countries, they share a common interest in trying to keep
and widen the development gap and in staving off the rise of emerging powers. As a result,
wealthy countries maintain their leading position in the post-Kyoto climate regime building
process. Developed countries initially communicated with and consulted big greenhouse gas
emitters in a bid to establish a rational and efficient post-Kyoto system that would safeguard
and coordinate balanced development between energy consumption, the Earth's climate, and
economic growth. At the same time, developed countries tried to persuade developing
countries to accept soft and hard environmental constraints. Western countries argue that the
Kyoto Protocol placed little responsibility on developing countries, and that the December
2009 Kyoto meeting in Copenhagen will impose carbon emission limits on China and India.
Second, due to the early-development advantage of developed countries and the latedevelopment advantage of developing countries, any major energy innovation would bring
about a new industrial revolution and the reallocation of global industry. Developed countries
have even launched a climate or carbon tax to put limitations on the economic growth of the
developing world, particularly China. Developing countries are gradually assuming the
obligations of stabilizing GHG. But because they lack new energy sources and advanced
technology, developing countries only become emerging markets for Western multinational
companies, while developed countries are making full use of climate change opportunities to
strengthen their technical and competitive edge. As a result, they continue to dominate the
international system. Obviously, the situation is the same for the environmental trade regime,
which would let developing countries bear the programmed baseline costs, while developed
countries bear incremental costs. Developed countries are doing that to increase the
environmental constraint for developing countries and eventually restrict the development of
developing countries with a hard law.
Third, efforts to establish a benign two-logics-of-climate-change-games regime for
global warming, though indispensable to solve the problem of climate change, have run into
many problems. These include restrictions imposed by both hard and soft laws, international
competition in innovation, and non-commercial technical assistance. The distribution of
environmental capacity and energy innovation require a healthy competitive environment and
mechanisms that will not only promote common progress in energy technologies and
economic restructuring but will also help the world embark on a low-carbon economy and
sustainable development.
China as the new developing industrial power and India are trying to meet their
growing demand for energy, and are also ironing out tensions as countries compete to secure
direct access to stable supply sources. Because of globalization, urbanization and
industrialization, energy consumption in developing countries has been growing rapidly. In
its World Energy Outlook 2006, the International Energy Agency pointed out that the
economies and populations of developing countries were growing faster than those of the
wealthier nations, “shifting the center of gravity of global energy demand.” It estimated that
more than 70 percent of the increase in global primary energy demand between now and
2030 will come from developing countries.53The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report estimates
that carbon dioxide emissions from energy use could rise by 45 percent to 110 percent
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between 2000 and 2030. The report indicates that two-thirds to three-quarters of the increased
emissions would come from developing countries. The report also makes it clear that the
greater the efforts to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, the less severe would be the
impact of climate change.54
4.2. Internal Responses to the Two Logics of Climate Change Games
China’s current per capita energy consumption is well below that of the developed world
(although above that of many poor countries), but by 2020 China will match the current
global average—meaning that China alone will account for almost one-third of the world's
total carbon emissions between 1990 and 2020. 55 To be sure, China's current per capita
emissions are low compared with industrialized countries, but with its almost 1.3 billion
population, China’s aggregate contribution to global warming is huge and growing. This
prospect becomes clear when one considers the burgeoning middle class in China, whose
lifestyle choices will lead to dramatic increases in per-capita energy use. China’s overall
carbon emissions by 2030 could reach 11 billion tons, well above those in the United States
(8 billion tons), Europe (4.5 billion tons), and India (nearly 2 billion tons). 56 China has
undertaken a number of policies and national development strategies, and created related
domestic institutions, specifically those related to climate change.57
Under its 11th five-year plan, the Chinese government expects to “accelerate the pace
of building a resource-efficient and environment-friendly society, and promote the
harmonization of economic development with the population, resources, and the
environment, reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by some 20 percent.”58 China
issued its National Action Plan on Climate Change in June 2007, and the government
selected a number of goals to reach by 2010: a 20-percent cut in energy intensity; increasing
renewable energy to 10 percent of the primary supply of energy, a substantial increase in
coal-bed methane production, and promotion of nuclear power.59
4.3. External Responses to the Two Logics of Climate Change Games
China has been intimately involved in the international debate on climate change. Like other
participants in the climate change negotiations, China wants to protect its interests and
promote development while also joining international efforts to address this problem.
However, it has consistently opposed efforts to require GHG limits by developing
countries—even those calling for voluntary commitments to restrict future emissions
increases. Instead, China has joined other developing countries in demanding that developed
countries reduce their carbon emissions first and provide assistance to developing countries to
help them cope with climate change and to implement sustainable development. It has usually
resisted any links between financial and technical assistance from developed countries in the
context of the climate change regime. Instead, it has demanded transfers of funds on
noncommercial and preferential terms, and has rejected many of the market-based
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international mechanisms for emissions reductions advocated by developed countries and
their industries.60
China has made some noteworthy contributions to climate-related international
negotiations, notably when doing so would help codify requirements that developed countries
help developing countries in the context of climate change. It proposed a resolution on
technology transfer, which was adopted by the first conference of the parties (COP) held in
Berlin in 1995. During COP2, China proposed that developed countries list in their national
communications measures they were undertaking to implement technology transfer to
developing countries. China has sometimes used a form of passive resistance during climate
change negotiations, articulating a policy of “no response” to some international events, such
as the Bush administration's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. In 2000, China put forward a
“no regrets” policy for the FCCC negotiations, meaning that it would share some concrete
responsibilities to reduce carbon emissions provided they do not adversely affect its
economic development.
Despite pressure from the United States, Europe and some other countries to reduce
its carbon emissions, China has to date refused to take on concrete commitments toward this
end. It expects the developed, wealthy countries of the world to substantially reduce their
emissions before China and other developing countries are expected to do so, in accordance
with the principle of common but differentiated responsibility adopted at the 1995 Berlin
conference of the parties. However, a significant shift in China’s energy policy and attitudes
toward the Kyoto Protocol arguably occurred when it endorsed the Bali Roadmap in 2007,
notably its paragraph on developing-country commitments: “Nationally appropriate
mitigation actions by developing country parties in the context of sustainable development,
supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity building, in a measurable,
reportable and verifiable manner” (Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change 2007: 3). 61 While this is hardly an embrace by the government of
limitations on China’s carbon emissions, it may be a harbinger of future acceptance of them.
At the 2007 APEC Summit, China’s President Hu Jintao put forward four proposals
for tackling climate change. These proposals have been regarded as China’s updated response
to international climate change negotiations: “First, cooperation is indispensable to global
efforts to tackle climate change. Second, efforts are needed to pursue sustainable
development, as climate change is ultimately a development issue and it can only be
addressed in the course of sustainable development. Third, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change should be upheld as the core mechanism for addressing
climate change. The Convention and its Kyoto Protocol constitute the legal basis of
international cooperation on climate change and are the most authoritative, universal and
comprehensive international framework for the issue. Fourth, efforts should be made to
promote scientific and technological innovation, as science and technology are important
means for tackling climate change.”62
Conclusion
The new century is an important milestone in the history of human development as half of the
world's population is about to enter into resource-intensive industrialized societies that may
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seriously affect traditional North-South relationships and international environmental
systems. Obviously, the climate crisis and energy resource difficulties would be the direct
consequences, while fierce competition among major powers in the distribution of
responsibilities, rights and interests of future development would be one of the potential
implications affecting power transition in the international system. Nowadays, as the U.S. and
EU economies recover and developing countries muster sustained economic growth, energy
supply is out of step with demand. The environmental pressure is growing, and the
geopolitical situation of the main oil-producing areas is unstable. Energy competition among
countries is concerned not only with the success of collective action, but also with the
transition of energy power in the international system.
This article endeavors to explain the two logics of the climate change games by
linking international competition for energy know-how and carbon emission negotiations.
There is a pressing need for rethinking the two-layer games in global climate change politics:
environmental governance and energy innovation competition between different countries.
On the one hand, it is now universally acknowledged that international cooperation and
collective action are necessary to mitigate global warming. On the other hand, the need to
secure access to new energy and know-how has increased and encouraged a growing number
of states to join the fray.
The need for access to energy resources has increased and more countries are making
greater demands for them. The loss of balance between human energy activities and the
preservation of nature in many parts of the world is attributed to environmental degradation,
in particular global warming. According to Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The global energy strategy
must satisfy three objectives: low cost, diverse supply, and drastically reduced carbon dioxide
emissions.”63
The world could benefit from the growth of developing countries, particularly China,
if a workable model could be devised that would truly manage the balance of energy and the
environment. A concerted transition to a low- or zero-carbon economy is the road that China
must choose, especially with financial and technical aid from the developed world. However,
such aid from the developed world is not enough. It is essential that climate change be fully
integrated into development policy, and rich countries should help developing countries build
the equity-based, sustainable, clean and low-carbon growth model. Otherwise collective
action against global warming is hopeless.
Western countries are uneasy about new rising countries such as China that would
probably confront the environmental status quo or the future allocation mechanism of
resources and try to seek ways, including hard and soft laws, to contain them. Under such
conditions, China’s strategy should be to be involved in these negotiations, on one hand by
actively coordinating the conflicts and competition triggered by the allocation of
environmental resources between different parties; and, on the other hand, by promoting the
global sharing of the achievements in technological innovation, while following the
“common development” approach to solve international environmental and political
problems.
China could, and we argue should, show moral leadership on climate change,
something that has been lacking among the developed countries. Alas, bearing in mind what
we have said, it seems unlikely that China would undertake such a pro-environment
leadership role in the Asian Pacific region or among developing countries more broadly.
There are clearly many Chinese scientists and concerned officials who would like China to do
much more. But there are also vested economic interests, exacerbated by China's infatuation
with rapid economic growth and wealth creation, which overwhelm the environmentalists.
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There is a burgeoning car culture—the same mistake as that made in the West—with a
rapacious appetite for petroleum. More broadly, there is an effort to emulate the West's
development and Western people's lifestyles, but with this comes an emulation of their
terrible history of pollution. This is unfortunate because a concerted transition to an economy
that produces fewer carbon emissions is possible, especially with financial and technical aid
from the developed world. However, such aid would have to come with clear restrictions that
the Chinese government has shown an unwillingness to accept. The upshot is that in the
future there will be some improvements that will limit the increases in China's carbon
emissions compared with what they might be otherwise. For the most part, however, at least
in the near term, it will be business as usual particularly in the long term.
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